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Workplace Justice
Without Unions
NOTE: This article draws upon research from the
authors’ book, Workplace Justice Without Unions,
which was published last year by the W.E. Upjohn
Institute for Employment Research. See http://www
.upjohninstitute.org for information on how to order
the book.

“W

here there is no rule of law
but only the command of persons, where
secrecy and arbitrariness reign, where one
never knows when or why the axe will
fall, there justice weeps” (Wolterstorff
2001).
Human dignity at the workplace
requires the right to just treatment by
those holding authority. At the crux of
this is protection from arbitrary action—
action that is based upon personality
rather than merit, and is not predictable
on any reasoned basis. When a human
being is treated as merely a means
to an end, a thing to be employed by
others, rather than as a person deserving
justice, justice does indeed weep. This
is especially true where a person’s job is
at stake. In our society, an individual’s
job is not only the source of economic
goods, but also an important part of
how we deﬁne ourselves—and others
deﬁne us—and our role in society. Where
workers can be terminated from their
employment for any reason, or none
at all, arbitrariness reigns. Yet, this is
historically the basic principle of the law
of employment termination in the United
States.
Corporations are social organizations
arranged in a hierarchy in which those
at the top exercise authority over those
at the bottom. This inevitably means
that control must be exerted over those
who are employed by others. In such
circumstances, both human nature
and differing interests between the
employed and the employer give rise to
a situation in which an abuse of power
is not only possible, but highly likely.
In the workplace there are order givers

and order takers. One instrument of
control by order givers is the threat
of termination of the relationship.
Ultimately, employees who do not behave
as they are ordered will be separated from
the organization—ﬁred.
Fortunately, since the days when
the employment-at-will principle was
adopted by American courts in the late
nineteenth century, there has been a
considerable erosion of it. What has
occurred over a period of about 90
years is the construction of a patchwork
of limitations on employment-atwill. Yet, the employer’s power is
still quite substantial. Arguably, it has
grown signiﬁcantly by virtue of some
recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions
approving employer-mandated arbitration
(employment arbitration).
The Practice of Workplace Justice
A major development in the area of
workplace justice has been the adoption
of organizational justice procedures by
nonunion employers. The more advanced
forms of these procedures have come
along relatively recently. Based on
data gathered in the late 1970s, Fred
Foulkes (1980) found that by far the most
common employer device for handling
employee grievances at that time was
the open-door policy, which is a very
rudimentary workplace justice procedure.
More advanced forms of nonbinding
policies have included 1) installing
an ombudsman, a corporate employee
who independently deals with worker
problems; and 2) mediation, where a
neutral third party works to facilitate a
resolution of the dispute.
An especially interesting
organizational justice procedure
originated in the 1980s—peer review
panels. Here, a panel of employees (and
sometimes managers) makes a ﬁnal
decision or recommendation regarding an

employee’s grievance.
The management-initiated
organizational justice system to
most recently rise to prominence is
employment arbitration. In employment
arbitration, a nonunion employer requires
employees to agree to submit any
complaints (or sometimes any allegations
of violation of law on the part of the
employer) to a neutral arbitrator who
will render a ﬁnal and binding decision
on the matter. This is by far the most
controversial of these systems. The
fairness of employment arbitration has
been vigorously attacked on the grounds
that it deprives employees of their legal
right to go to court, and to a jury trial,
and substitutes an employer-mandated
system that is set up and controlled by the
employer.
Design of the Study
There is a substantial literature on
workplace justice; much of it relates
to employment arbitration. However,
a systematic analysis of this literature,
while useful, fails to produce any solid
conclusions with respect to the main
questions of interest. To remedy this,
we have gathered an extensive body of
new data in an attempt to move toward
clearer answers to the issues inherent
in these systems. The empirical portion
of our study has several aspects. First,
in order to judge the substantive results
obtained under these various procedures,
we analyze overall win/loss rates by
employees in a sample of termination
cases in labor arbitration and employment
arbitration and in a sample of cases from
federal courts.
Our second and most intensive
research strategy is our attempt to
determine the degree to which the same
result would be reached in the same cases
across different types of decision makers.
This is tested by posing hypothetical
scenarios to labor arbitrators,
employment arbitrators, managers,
members of peer review panels, jurors in
employment discrimination cases, and
labor court judges from other countries.
By analyzing the responses to these
scenarios, we can compare the harshness
or leniency of the systems toward
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employees for different disciplinary
offenses, and the criteria used to reach
decisions.
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Table 1 Employee/Employer Win Rates
Procedure
Employment arbitrationa
Overall
n = 216

Results
Existing studies that evaluate
workplace justice systems by looking
at the win/loss rates by employees and
employers show that the results are
mixed. Probably the most striking result
is the low percentage of employee wins
in discrimination cases in federal courts.
When we analyzed data on win/loss
rates from our own sample of arbitration
awards and recent reports of federal court
decisions, we obtained the results set out
in Table 1.
Although comparing the overall
win rate of employees in employment
arbitration with those in the other
two procedural alternatives is of
some interest, the most meaningful
comparisons are between results in
particular categories of employment
arbitration cases and other systems. Our
most pertinent comparison is of court
cases involving claims of discrimination
in violation of a federal statute and
employment arbitration cases involving
that same claim.
In employment arbitration cases
where a federal discrimination statute
was involved, employees won 22 percent
of the cases. This compares to only 12
percent in federal district courts in the
most recent ﬁve-year period. Thus, the
chances of an employee winning would
appear to be much greater in employment
arbitration than in court when the case
goes to a ﬁnal adjudication. However,
this does not take settlements into
account.
In labor arbitration cases under a
collective bargaining contract, unlike
court cases enforcing a federal statute,
the employer has the burden of proving
misconduct and the propriety of the
penalty. Usually the standard is proof
by a preponderance of the evidence.
However, more serious cases may require
proof by clear and convincing evidence,
or even proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The principal limitation on the kind
of analysis described so far is that it
does not hold constant the nature of the
cases decided upon in the various justice
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Percent employee wins

Percent employer wins

33

67

Federal discrimination statute involved
n = 59

22

78

Employment contract
n = 52

56

44

Burden of proof on employer
n = 57

60

40

Labor arbitrationb
n = 580

52

48

Federal district courtc
1996–2000
n = 26,841

12

88

16

84

1987–2000
n = 53,248

SOURCE: Bureau of National Affairs, Labor Arbitration Reports, 1994–2002; American Arbitration
Association, Employment Dispute Arbitration Reports, 1999–2000.
b
SOURCE: Bureau of National Affairs, Labor Arbitration Reports, 1994–2002.
c
SOURCE: Federal District-Court Civil Cases, 2001. See http://teddy.law.cornell.edu:8090.
a

systems. It is to this limitation that the
most intensive portion of our research
addresses itself. This stage of our study
consists of developing hypothetical cases
on termination of employment and asking
different types of decision makers to
indicate whether they would ﬁnd in favor
of the employer or the employee if they
were deciding the case. We attempted not
only to discover tendencies to decide in
favor of either employees or employers,
but also to determine what were the
important factors that inﬂuence different
decision makers. The decision makers
to whom these hypothetical cases were
posed included employment arbitrators,
labor arbitrators, peer review panelists,
human resources ofﬁcers, persons who
had served as jurors in discrimination
cases, and labor court judges from several
countries.
The results of our work on
hypothetical cases are complex. One
relatively simple set of ﬁndings that
provides something of an overall view of
the results indicates that, in response to
our hypothetical cases, the percentage of
cases decided in favor of employees was
greatest by labor arbitrators (55 percent)
and labor court judges (51 percent);
lowest for employment arbitrators,
both when they were deciding statutory
claims (25 percent) and when they were

applying a “for cause” requirement in
a contract of employment (33 percent);
and in between these extremes for HR
managers (46 percent), peer review
panelists (45 percent), and jurors (38
percent). So, holding constant the
particular cases decided produces results
that are quite different from the results of
looking at overall win/loss rates as we do
in Table 1. These bare results, although
useful, should be viewed with some
caution, and should be understood in the
context of the complete body of results
and analysis.
Professors Hoyt Wheeler, Brian Klaas, and Douglas
Mahony are faculty members at the Moore School
of Business, University of South Carolina.
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